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The Hypothesis, the Context, the Messianic, 
the Political, the Economic, the Technological*
On D errida’s Specters o f  M arx 
Sim on Critchley
»I once said, perhaps rightly: The earlier culture will 
become a heap o f rubble and finally a heap o f ashes, but 
spirits will hover over the ashes.«
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value
T o begin with, let us try to be quite clear about what Derrida is affirming in Specters o f Marx (SdM1). Although he claims from the beginning to the 
end of SdM that Marxism is plus dun  (both more than one and no longer one), 
and that deconstruction has neither been Marxist nor non-Marxist (SdM 126- 
7/75), and that, as Marx said before him, »What is certain is that I am not a 
Marxist« (SdM 145/88), Derrida’s affirmation in this text is the following:
»Deconstruction has never had any sense or interest, in my view at least, 
except as a radicalization, which is also to say in the tradition o f a certain 
Marxism, in a certain spirit of Marxism.« (SdM 151/92)
Although Derrida has understandable reservations about the felicity of the 
word ‘radicalization’, he elsewhere speaks, to use another word he has 
problematized, of the position (SdM 92/53) he is going to defend in terms of 
assuming the Marxist heritage, »one must (il faut -  with all the force that the il 
faut commands in a whole series of Derrida’s texts, s.c.) assume the heritage 
of Marxism...« (SdM 93/54).
* The following is the text of a lecture delivered in October 1994 to the meeting of the 
Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in Seattle. I would like to thank John 
D. Caputo for giving me the occasion to prepare this lecture. It was subsequently presented, in 
various guises, to a conference on ‘Deconstruction and Politics’ at the University of Essex 
(October 1994), to the Cambridge Graduate Seminar in Literary Theory at King’s College 
(November 1994), to the Amsterdam School of Cultural Analysis (February 1995) and to the 
‘ Spectres o f Derrida’ conference at Birkbeck College, London (May 1995). An abriged version 
of the present text appeared as ‘On Derrida’s Specters o f Marx', in Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, Vol.21, No.3 (1995), pp. 1-30.
1 References to SdM will be given to the pagination of the French Text (Galilée, Paris, 1993) 
followed by a reference to the extremely accurate English translation (trans. P. Kamuf, 
Routledge, London and New York, 1994).
Fil. vest. /Acta Phil, XVI (2/1995), 81-108.
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Deconstruction is marxism, it would seem. A formula that we will have to put 
alongside Derrida’s other hyperbolic formulations, that »deconstruction is 
justice«, or, more awkwardly, »America is deconstruction«2. I don’t know 
how shocking this identification of deconstruction with Marxism might ap­
pear. To Derrida-watchers it shouldn’t exactly come as news, particularly 
regarding a number of elements in his career: his early interest in Tran Due 
Thao’s attempted reconciliation of phenomenology and dialectical material­
ism, his radicalisation of the thought of economy from his earliest work, 
particularly in his essay on Bataille, and his revealing comments on Marxism 
during the ‘Political Seminar’ of Les fins de I ’homme3. However, if deconstruc­
tion is a certain reception, continuation and continued radicalization of the 
Marxist heritage, then we are still no closer understanding what this might 
mean. To do this I would like to begin by briefly discussing the hypothesis 
advanced in SdM and making a couple of remarks about the context for the 
book. I will then go on to discuss what I see as the central theme of SdM: the 
messianic. As a way of unpacking this theme, I will address a number of sub­
themes in SdM: the injunction of différance, democracy to come (la démocratie 
à venir), justice, religion and the es spukt (it spooks). As a consequence of this 
discussion, I would like to turn to the theme of the political and address the 
sub-themes of hegemony, the decision and the New International. I conlcude, 
more speculatively, with brief discussions of two more themes: the economic, 
specifically the relation of deconstruction to capitalism, and the technological, 
where I focus on some of Derrida’s hints on the relation of spectrality to 
technicity and try to approach Derrida as a thinker of originary technicity.
2 Derrida momentarily ventures this hypothesis in Mémoires for Paul de Man (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1986, p. 18) before quickly dismissing it. As Stanley Cavell points 
out, America is, »the anti-Marxist country« (Must We Mean What We Say, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1969, p. 345-46). But if America were deconstruction, then what 
spirit of Marxism would haunt it? I am referring to work in preparation on Cavell and in 
particular to his extraordinary discussion of the Marx Brothers in ‘Nothing Goes Without 
Saying’ (London Review o f Books, 6 January, 1994, pp. 3-5), where, in the final paragraph, and 
in a clear allusion to Derrida, Cavell suggests that, better even than Emerson or Thoreau, access 
to »that tangle of American culture« might best be had by »a few days immersion in half a dozen 
Marx Brother’s films«. What is the specter of Marx for America? Is it Karl-o or Groucho?
3 On the influence of Tran Due Thao’s Phénoménologie et matérialisme dialectique (Editions 
Minh-Tan, Paris, 1951), see Derrida’s remarks in an interview with Le Monde in 1982 
(Entretiens avec ‘Le Monde ’ [Editions la découverte, Paris, 1984], p. 79); and remarks in the 
‘Avertissement’ to Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl (Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1990), p. vii. On economy, see ‘From Restricted to General 
Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve’, in Writing and Difference, trans. A Bass 
(Routledge, London and New York, 1978), pp. 251-77. On politics, see Les fins de l'homme. 
A partir du travail de Jacques Derrida (Galilée, Paris, 1981), p. 526-27.
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The Hypothesis
Derrida’s hypothesis in SdM has a structure that will be extremely familiar to 
readers of his work. He spells it out schematically in the concluding pages of 
the text,
»On the one hand (D'une part), Marx insists on respecting the originality and 
the proper efficacity, the autonomization and automatization o f ideality as 
finite-infinite processes o f différance (phantomatic, fantastic, fetishistic, or 
ideological)...But, on the other hand (d’autre part)...Marx continues to want to 
ground his critique o f his exorcism o f the spectral simulacrum in an ontology. 
It is a -  critical, but pre-deconstructive -  ontology of presence as actual 
reality and as objectivity. This critical ontology means to deploy the possibility 
o f dissipating the phantom, let us venture to say again o f conjuring it away as 
the representative consciousness o f the subject, and o f bringing this represen­
tation back to the world o f labor, production and exchange, so as to reduce it 
to its conditions. Pre-deconstructive here does not mean false, unnecessary, or 
illusory.« (SdM 269/170)
D ’une part... d ’autre part -  this is the double gesture, the rhythm of double or 
what I call elsewhere clôturai reading that has haunted Derrida’s work since 
the 1960’s, of which the examples are legion, and which is the most distinctive 
motif of deconstruction as a way of reading4. As always, Derrida reads with 
two hands, following assiduously and indefatigably the unstable limit that 
divides what we might call the logic of a text, its fundamentally aporetic or 
undecidable basic concepts and distinctions, from the intentions that attempt 
to govern that text, the author-ity that tries dissolve or control those aporias. 
As is so often the case, Derrida focuses this double gesture in the ambivalent 
usage of a specific word by the author he is considering, in this case Spectre, 
Gespenst. Previous examples, of course, are Geist in Heidegger,pharmakon in 
Plato, supplément in Rousseau, and so on. So, at the formal level at least, SdM 
»c’est du bon Derrida, n’est-ce pas?« Always the same, yet always different in 
each particular instance of reading; a singular event and the eternal return of 
the same. But, after all, could we or should expect Derrida not to be Derrida?
However, to operate strategically with a pre-deconstructive distinction, if the 
double gesture gives us the form  of Derrida’s reading of Marx, then what of 
the content to his hypothesis? To introduce detail that will only become clear 
later on, the basic claim that Derrida makes is that, on the one hand, Marx 
respects the spectrality of différance at the basis of any conceptual order, 
political regime or mode of economic organization. For Derrida, this is exem-
4 See The Ethics o f  Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Blackwell, Oxford, 1992), pp. 20-31
& 88-97.
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plified in a number of specific ways: in Marx’s treatment of technology and 
the media, his thinking of the spectrality of communisn (»A spectre is haunt­
ing Europe -  the spectre of communism«), and the spectrality of capital itself: 
the fetish character of the commodity form, the non-phenomenologizable 
mystery of exchange value, and the subtle evasiveness and tendency-to-invis- 
ibility of ideology. This leads Derrida to one side of his hypothesis, that the 
figure of the spectre or phantom is not just one figure amongst others in 
Marx’s text, it is rather »la figure cachée de toutes les figures« (SdM 194/120). 
The basic task of Derrida’s reading in SdM is to survey this phantomachia peri 
tes ousias that runs through Marx’s texts, which is traced through a partial 
reading of the Communist Manifesto, the Second Chapter of Volume I of 
Capital and, most impressively, a reading of Marx’s critique of Stirner in The 
German Ideology.
This leads Derrida to the claim that there is, to use his neologism, a hantologie 
in Marx’s text, a certain irreducible spectrality and différance at work, a logic 
of haunting that, for Derrida, is the condition of possibility and impossibility 
of any conceptual order5. One of the crucial distinctions in SdM turns, charac­
teristically for Derrida, on a homonym, namely the difference between ontologie 
and hantologie, a difference that can only be marked grammatologically in 
writing, that by-passes phoneticization. I will specify ontology in a moment, 
but let it be noted that Derrida’s claim early in the book is that this hantologie 
is not only more powerful and ample than any ontology or thinking of Being,
i.e. Heidegger’s, but contains within it, as a secondary effect, any eschatology 
or teleology linked to such ontology, whether that be an eschatology of Being, 
of class struggle, of divive revelation, or whatever (SdM 31/10). In a gesture 
that will be familiar to Derrida-watchers, ontologie is a apocalyptic discourse 
on or of the end, whereas hantologie is a discourse on the end of the end6.
Marx is therefore, according to Derrida, a hantological thinker. This is what 
his texts say. This is the logic that governs them, that makes them possible, 
despite themselves. However, following the other side of the double gesture -  
d ’autre p a r t-  if Marx’s texts respect a logic of spectrality that is, as Derrida 
implies in the above quote, deconstructive, then, as Derrida makes crystal 
clear in his reading of the critique of Stirner in The German Ideology, Marx 
also wanted to be rid of phantoms and spectres. Of course, Marx shares this 
tendency with the Young Hegelians (Bauer, Feuerbach, Stirner) -  and, I would 
claim, with Hegel himself -  insofar as they wanted to free philosophy and 
consciousness of the illusions to which it had subjected itself in history, in
5 On hantologie, see SdM 31, 89 & 255/10, 51, 161.
6 Cf. ‘Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy’, trans. J.P. Leavey, Oxford 
Literary Review, Vol.6, No.2 (1984), pp. 3-37.
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particular the illusory spectrality of religion. However, as is well known, the 
young Marx’s problem with the Young Hegelians was that they concerned 
themselves with ‘German philosophy and not German reality’, and restricted 
their critique of spectrality to the realm of consciousness and its objects. 
However, Marx’s discourse was not only directed against the spectrality and 
Vorstellungsdenken of the Young Hegelians, but also against the spectre of 
ideology, that is, »the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophical«7 
forms through which the ideas of the hegemonic class become the ideas of the 
epoch, and also against the spectrality of bourgeois economy characterized by 
the fetish character of the commodity form and the phantom nature of ex­
change value.
Furthermore, Marx wanted to found his critique of spectrality on what Derrida 
refers to as an ontology, which is critical but pre-deconstructive. Why pre- 
deconstructive? Because, to echo Derrida’s words, it is a critique of political 
economy that has as its horizon or foundation a conception of presence as 
effective reality or objectivity, what Derrida elsewhere refers to as the living 
present of life, praxis, production and labour. The unstable limit that Marx’s 
text criss-crosses at various points is that between the deconstructive and the 
pre-deconstructive, between hantologie and ontologie. Thus, the general hy­
pothesis here is that Marx’s analysis and critique of the Young Hegelians, of 
the German Ideology, and of bourgeois political economy is deconstructive 
and hantological, but it becomes pre-deconstructive when that critique is 
referred to or founded upon an ontology of presence, effectivity, praxis and 
objectivity. Derrida’s characteristically quasi-transcendental claim is that 
hantologie is the condition of possibility for ontologie, that is, although Marx 
makes a decision to refer the critique of capital to an ontology of presence, this 
decision cannot repress what we might call the spectral drive or différance 
which would ruin any such ontology avant la lettre. Thus, although Derrida is 
reading with two hands, his reading is not even-handed, he is not offering an 
even choice between hantologie and ontologie, rather he is showing how this 
ambivalence is structured or staged in Marx’s text, but hantologie has theoreti­
cal priority, it is from this spectral drive that something like thought is born 
(SdM 260/165)
(I have a parenthetical worry here about what counts as Marx’s ontology: 
Derrida refers to an ontology of presence in Marx but how are we to under­
stand this? I take it that Marx’s ‘ontology’ is located in what, at the beginning 
o f The German Ideology, he refers to as the »presuppositions« of his approach, 
namely that »we begin with real individuals, together with their actions and
7 Cf. ‘Preface to a Contribution to the Critique o f  Political Economy’, Marx/Engels Selected 
Works (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968), p. 182.
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the material conditions of life, those in which they find themselves, as well as 
those which they have created through their own efforts«8. That is, we begin 
with an insight into the fundamentality of the social production of life -  »As 
individuals express their life so they are« -  in terms of a dialectic between 
individual forces of production and the arrangement of the relations of produc­
tion into which those forces are born, and which constitutes the economic 
structure of society. I take it that Marx’s ontology is located in his insight into 
the dialectic of forces and relations of production, which generates both the 
materialist conception of history and an agenda for political action, let’s call it 
communism. Two thoughts on this: is this an ontology? To my knowledge, 
Marx doesn’t use this word in this sense and I imagine that many scholars of 
Marx would be suspicious of this terminology. For example, J. O’Malley in 
his recent helpful edition of Marx’s Early Political Writings calls this ‘ontol­
ogy’ a »materialist guideline«9. Thus, the notion of ontology here would seem 
to presuppose the hermeneutic grid of a Heideggerian conception of meta­
physics which is not, as Derrida has shown better than anyone, exempt from 
deconstruction. Secondly, and more importantly, if the elements of Marx’s 
‘ontology’ are somehow ‘pre-deconstructive’, then what does this mean? 
Derrida is careful to point out in the above quote that pre-deconstructive does 
not mean »false, unnecessary or illusory«, but presumably neither does it 
mean ‘true, necessary or real’. If the elements of Marx’s ‘ontology’ are pre- 
deconstructive, then what remains that we might call (pre-deconstructively) 
substantive or at the level of content in a deconstructive Marxism? What force 
does Marxism retain if we set to one side its materialist account of life, 
production, praxis and history? I completely agree with Derrida that there are 
certain ontologies that we can do without, for example the Marxist-Leninist 
economic determinism of dialectical materialism, and we must constantly 
resist the temptation to ossification and dogmatism into which Marx’s dis­
course can fall, but does this qualification disqualify all ontologies? Can we do 
without ontology or, better, an ontological moment if we are Marxists, even 
deconstructive Marxists? And what remains of Marxism when we set to one 
side this ontological baggage? I will return to this question below in my 
discussion of the political.10)
8 The German Ideology (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1970), p. 42.
9 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), p. xv.
10 A permanent risk of SdM, I feel, is its tendency to attempt to reinvent the wheel with respect 
to Marxism by ignoring the attempts, within the Marxist philosophical tradition itself, to refine 
and revise Marx’s work and to save it from its theoretical and practical distortions, whether we 
think here of Lukacs, Gramsci, or Adorno and Horkheimer. Might we not ascribe this tendency 
to what one might call an Althusserian ‘tic’ in SdM (Althusser is clearly a specter thoughout this 
text, SdM 147/89), that is, that one can bracket out the previous history of Marxist philosophy 
insofar as that has somehow been contaminated by »la grande dérive soviétique« and return to 
Marx’s text, and, literally, lire le Capital. The only real exception to this rule is Benjamin, who
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The Context
However, if Derrida’s hypothesis in SdM claims a theoretical argument for the 
primacy of spectrality, then is this Derrida’s only reason for writing SdM? Is 
there not, to use another pre-deconstructive paleonym, a normative claim 
running through SdM which allows us to establish something like the context 
for this text. Why read Marx now?
In the paragraph that follows the statement of the hypothesis that we have been 
commenting on, Derrida makes the following remark,
»That the ontological and the critical are pre-deconstructive, has political 
consequences that are perhaps not negligible. And they are doubtless not 
negligible, to say it too quickly here, as concerns the concept o f the political, 
as concerns the political itself.« (SdM 270/170-71)
To express a thought telegraphically and in a way that I will try to make good 
below, the normative drive of SdM, and what I find so impressive about the 
text -  so urgent and so clear — is its attempt at a politicization or, better, re­
politicization (SdM 144/87) of deconstruction, an attempted reinvention of the 
political in terms of a Marxist hantologie. But what is Derrida arguing against? 
That is, what are the political consequences of a pre-deconstructive ontology 
and critique? They are twofold, or rather there are at least two elements to the 
context for SdM, one within Marxism, one outside of Marxism, the latter 
being much more important for Derrida. What they have in common is a 
refusal of spectrality.
1. Within Marxism, a strong point of Derrida’s reading is the link he draws 
between what he rather euphemistically calls »the totalitarian heritage of 
Marx’s thought« (SdM 170/104) and the refusal of spectrality. Totalitarian­
ism, or what Jean-Luc Nancy calls ‘immanentism’, in all its recent and less- 
recent guises, is a political form of society governed by a logic of identifica­
tion, where ‘everything is political’ that is, where all areas of social life are 
claimed to represent incarnate power: the proletariat is identified with the 
people, the party with the proletariat, the politburo with the party, the leader 
with the politburo, and so on. Totalitarianism is the phantasy of a completed 
and transparent social order, a unified people among whom difference or 
social division is denied. In terms of SdM, totalitarianism is premised upon a
is a decisive specter in SdM. But why is Benjamin accorded this unique state of exception? For 
the most part, Derrida’s scholarly sources on Marx (excluding references to external classical 
sources, like Freud and Heidegger) are exclusively French-Etienne Balibar is treated very well, 
Michel Henry less so, and Blanchot’s piece ‘Les trois paroles de Marx’ is the intellectual 
framework for Chapter 1. Indeed, SdM could be seen as a contemporary rewriting of Blanchot’s 
essay, particularly if we take seriously Derrida’s extremely astute remarks on the analogies 
between the 1950’s ‘end of ideology’ thesis and the 1989 ‘end of history’ thesis.
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refusal of spectrality, it is, as Derrida puts it, a »panic before the phantom in 
general«, that is, before something which escapes, transcends and returns to 
haunt the social order. Although totalitarianism is a grotesque distortion of 
Marx’s thinking, particularly of what I would see as its fundamentally demo­
cratic ethos (which is, of course, powerfully and rightly critical of the formal­
ism of bourgeois liberal democracy, of the latter’s attempt to have political 
equality without economic equality), it is clear how totalitarianism inherits a 
certain conception of ‘the end to politic’s within Marx’s text, what he called 
the abolition of the state and which Engels referred to as its ‘withering away’. 
Against the troubling tendency to subordinate the political to the socio-eco- 
nomic within Marx’s ‘ontology’, which was transformed into the economism 
of the Second International, Derrida’s argument for a logic of spectrality 
within Marxism can be linked to the claim for the irreducibility of the political 
understood as that moment where the sedimented meanings of the socio­
economic are contested. Following Ernesto Laclau’s radicalization of Gramsci, 
one might link the logic of spectrality to the logic of hegemony; that is, if one 
renounces -  as one must -  the communist eschatological ‘a-theodicy’ of the 
economic contradictions of capitalism inevitably culminating in revolution, 
then politics and politico-cultural-ideological hegemonization is indispensable 
to the possibility of radical change. I will come back to this below11.
2. Outside of Marxism, and here we come to the real context for SdM, if there 
is a refusal of spectrality within totalitarianism, then there is an equal refusal 
of it in that anti-Marxist consensus that celebrates the ‘collapse of commu­
nism’ in terms of the uncontestable triumph of liberal democracy. The context 
for SdM is the hegemony of the teleological discourse on the death or end of 
Marxism, which, as I mentioned above, Derrida rightly sees with a sense of 
déjà vu, as a rehearsal of the 1950’s end of ideology thesis. Derrida detects a 
three-fold thread to this hegemony in the recent behaviour of the political
11 Laclau has responded to the reading of Specters ofMarx attempted here in his review essay ‘ The 
Time is Out of Joint’, to appear in Diacritics, which offers some important critical clarification 
of Derrida’s arguments, particularly on the question o f necessity for discourses of incarnation 
and the irreducible teleology of the classical discourse of emancipation that Derrida supposedly 
wants to endorse. However, Laclau is unconvinced of the necessity for the move from a notion 
of messianic promise to an ethico-political inj unction in the way I develop it in the present essay 
and in my other work. For Laclau, no ethical injunction of a Levinasian kind flows from 
undecidability and democratic politics does not need to be anchored in such an injunction. He 
concludes by focussing what he sees as an ambiguity in Derrida’s work, between undecidability 
as the terrain of radicalization of the decision and undecidability as the source of an ethical 
injunction. If this is indeed an ambiguity in Derrida (and I am not wholly convinced of this), then 
Laclau and I stand at opposing poles of this ambiguity. However, my ambition in the discussion 
of the political given below is to show how these two poles can enter into some form of 
productive tension.
The Hypothesis, the Context, the Messianic, the Political. 89
class, the media and intellectuals (SdM 91-92/52-53). As an example of this 
anti-Marxist hegemony, Derrida chooses Fukuyama’s The End o f History and 
the Last Man, which is the focus of the engaging second chapter to SdM. 
Derrida quite rightly and very persuasively places Fumuyama’s end-of-history 
thesis in the tradition of Americian Straussianism continued by Fukuyama’s 
teacher, Allan Bloom, and going back, via Leo Strauss, to Kojève’s interpreta­
tion of Hegel. In a way that recalls Derrida’s discussion of an apocalyptic tone 
in philosophy, he shows how Fukuyama’s neo-liberal euphoria of the end of 
history is essentially a Hegelian-Kojèvian theodicy where liberal democracy, 
allegedly rooted in a recognition of the dignity of human beings and economic 
effectivity, is the realization of the kingdom of God on earth. Thus, the end of 
history would be the final eradication of the spectre of communism and the 
universal incarnation of liberal democracy. Thus, Fukuyama opposes the 
spectre of Marxism with a certain Hegelian/Kojèvian Christian logic of incar­
nation as the end of history.
Although seemingly diametrically opposed, both elements of the context for 
SdM (and these two elements by no means exhaust its context) follow a logic 
that is premised upon a refusal of spectrality; they are both discourses on and 
of the end: apocalyptic discourses. We could go further and claim that both 
discourses are Christian in Hegel’s sense of the word, that is, discourses of 
incarnation12 and revelation, ultimately the incarnation of community, abso­
lute knowing as community, the system as socio-political comedy (of course, 
there are other, and perhaps more persuasive, readings of Hegel than the comic 
reading). This thought can be linked to an opposition that runs throughout 
SdM, and which is particularly important in the final chapter, between spectrality 
and phenomenology. The specter is precisely that which refuses phenomeno- 
logization, that retreats before the gaze that tries to see it, like the ghost of 
Hamlet’s father. The specter is the apparition of the inapparent13. Phenomeno­
logy is here conceived in its Hegelian rather than Husserlian sense14, as that
12 On incarnation, see Laclau ‘The Time is Out of Joint’, op. cit.
13 Which still leaves open the question of whether there can be a phenomenology o f  spectrality, 
a phenomenology ofthe inapparent, to take up Heidegger’s phrase from the Zähringen seminar 
in 1973. As the title o f the final chapter of SdM suggests, ‘L’apparition de l’inapparent: 
l'«escomatage« phénoménologique’, Derrida is here alluding to debates about the status of 
French phenomenology and its alleged theological turn. On this debate, see Dominique 
Janicaud, Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française (L’éclat, Combas, 1991) 
and Jean-Luc Marion, Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger et la 
phénoménologie (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1989).
14 On Husserl, see the intriguing and slightly hurried note (SdM 215-16/189), where Derrida, 
pondering the question o f the specter in Husserlian phenomenology, focuses on the notion of 
the noema, as that »intentional but non-real component of phenomenological lived experi­
ence«, which would be »the condition o f any experience...«.
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active experience (Erfahrung) where objects become objects for conscious­
ness. In this sense, phenomenology is always a phenomenology of spirit 
(subject becoming spirit and spirit becoming subject), or a becoming- 
phenomenologizable of the specter, in a logic which is both Christian, insofar 
as Christ is the phenomenologization of the spectrality of the divine, and, as 
the Young Hegelians were perfecty aware, post-Christian insofar as Christian­
ity is the self-alienation of consciousness or human essence. For Derrida, the 
irreducibility of the spectral is thematically linked to the irreducibility of the 
religious. But, in order to understand what this means we must turn to the 
central theme of SdM: the messianic.
The Messianic
First, a word on ghosts. In the characteristically elliptical opening to SdM, 
entitled ‘Exordium’ (possibly an allusion to Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trem­
bling), Derrida suggests that without speaking to and of ghosts we would not 
be able to be responsible either to the living or to the not-yet or no-longer 
living. Thus, the discourse on specters is the condition for what, with Ben­
jamin, we would call an anamnesic solidarity with the dead of history and for 
those as yet unborn15. Thus, the discourse with and on specters proceeds in the 
name of justice, as this word is presented in the essay ‘Force of Law’, which is 
in many ways the Ur-text for SdM, although the former presents the barest 
bones of the latter16. Indeed, in SdM -  as in ‘Force of Law’ -  Derrida cites 
Levinas and employs the latter’s conception of justice from Totality and 
Infinity to illustrate his own account (SdM 48-49/23)17. Justice here defines 
and is defined by the ethical relation to the other, »la relation avec autrui -  
c ’est à dire la justice«. In Derridian terms, Justice is the undeconstructable 
condition of possibility for deconstruction, the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ 
deconstruction takes place, »but«, Derrida notes, »we can call it by other 
names«. The messianic will be one of those other names.
Thus, SdM proceeds in the name of justice, whether ethical or political, and 
speaks of specters in order to try and do justice to the living, the dead and the 
unborn. Running through Derrida’s opening remarks is a critique of any
15 A view perversely paralelled in the Mormon doctrines of baptism for the dead and spirits for 
the unborn as described by Harold Bloom in The American Religion (Simon & Schuster, New 
York, 1992), pp. 112-28.
16 ‘Force ofLaw: The Mystical Foundation of Authority’, inD.Comelletall. (eds.), Deconstruction 
and the Possibility o f  Justice (Routledge, London and New York, 1992).
171 discuss this in more detail in ‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism -  Is Derrida a Private Ironist 
or a Public Liberal?’, European Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 1994),pp. 1-21,see 
esp. pp. 14-16.
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account of justice that would restrict responsibility only to the living, to the 
presently living, or to the living present. In a manner that is difficult to present 
cogently outside the dense allusiveness and performative compression of the 
opening pages of SdM, Derrida is weaving together his account of justice with 
his early deconstruction of the lebendige Gegenwart in Husserlian phenom­
enology, to suggest that justice is somehow constituted by différance.
Before unpacking this claim, we should note that there are two prime candi­
dates for accounts of justice that would restict responsibility to the living. 
Firstly in Marx himself, recall the famous words from The German Ideology 
cited above -  »as individuals express their life, so they are« -  where Marx’s 
thinking would seem to be rooted in an ontology of life. Secondly, we can also 
note an oblique debate with Michel Henry’s reading of Marx, for whom life, 
for Henry the subjective praxis of living individuals, is the foundation upon 
which economic and meta-economic reality can be constructed18. Against 
Marx’s and Henry’s primacy of la vie, an approach that the latter would call 
phenomenological, Derrida posits a notion of la sur-vie (living-on, sur-vival), 
which one could trace back to his readings of Blanchot19. This notion, which 
only occurs, to my knowledge, on three occasions in the text (SdM 17, 179 & 
235-6/xx, 187, 147), plays a quiet but organizing function. The nearest one 
gets to an explanation of sur-vie is when the debate with Henry surfaces in a 
long footnote (SdM 177-79/186-88). For Henry, Marx’s metaphysical deter­
mination of reality in terms of praxis, production and, ultimately, life, gives 
rise to an entirely novel conception of subjectivity as »une puissance immergée 
en soi et qui s’éprouve soi-même sans distance«20; that is to say, as radically 
immanent subjectivity constituted through affectivity. Although Derrida might 
be said, in principle, to grant the ontological plausibility of Henry’s reading of 
Marx, as »the hyper-phenomenological principle of the flesh-and-blood pres­
ence of the living person...« (SdM 230/191), Derrida opposes this reading with 
his own hauntological approach. After posing some persuasive critical ques­
tions to Henry, Derrida writes revealingly,
» We are attempting something else. To try to accede to the possibility o f this 
very alternative (life and/or death), we are directing our attention to the 
effects or the petition o f a living-on or survival [une sur-vie] or o f a return o f 
the dead (neither life nor death) on the sole basis o f which one is able to speak 
o f  ‘living subjectivity’ (in opposition to its death).« (SdM 179/187)
18 C£ Marx, 2 Vols.: 1. Une philosophie de la réalité. 2. XJne philosophie de l ’économie, 
(Gallimard, Paris, 1976). For an abridged introduction to Henry ’ s reading of Marx, see his essay 
‘Marx’, to appear in Blackwell’s Companion to Continental Philosophy, ed. S. Critchley 
(Blackwell, Oxford, forthcoming).
19 See, in particular, ‘Sur-vivre’ in Parages (Galilée, Paris, 1986), pp. 117-218.
20 In Henry, ‘Marx’, op. cit.
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By following the path of the specter and the logic of spectrality in Marx’s text, 
Derrida is obviously seeking to deconstruct the limit between the living and 
the non-living and show that the seeming priority of life in fact presupposes a 
sur-vie that undermines this priority. We speak of ghosts in the name of 
justice.
However -  and this is an extremely difficult thought to get to grips with, but it 
is a capital idea -  to claim that justice is constituted by différance is not to 
imply that justice is deferred, delayed or indefinitely postponed: »demain on 
rase gratis«, »it’s jam tomorrow«. Différance is falsely accused of procrastina­
tion or of evading the pressing needs of the present with the so-called luxury of 
undecidability. On the contrary, Derrida’s whole effort in SdM is in thinking 
the injunction, be it the injunction of Marx (the title of the first chapter) or the 
injunction of différance. As Derrida remarks in an interview given at the time 
of the publication of SdM, »There would be no différance without urgency, 
emergency, imminence, precipitation, the ineluctable, the unforseen arrival of 
the other, to the other to whom reference and deference are made«21. With an 
urgency and precipitation that marks the whole tone of the book, making its 
prose restless and light22, Derrida writes, and I quote at length,
»In the incoercible différance the here-now [l’ici-maintenant] unfurls. Without 
lateness, without delay, but without presence, it is the precipitation o f  an
21 Derrida, ‘The Deconstruction of Actuality’, Radical Philosophy, No.68 (Autumn 1994), p. 32.
22 Mention of the restlessness and lightness of Derrida’s prose in SdM can be related to a common 
complaint one often hears in circles otherwise highly sympathetic to Derrida’s work. It is 
claimed that Derrida’s early work, in particular La voix et le phénomène, is philosophically 
decisive in the deployment of deconstruction and that it possesses a rigour sadly lacking in his 
later work, which too often seems to have been written in undue haste. Perhaps there is some 
truth to such a claim. However, what such a complaint consistently overlooks is precisely the 
question of the urgency, or the injunction that drives Derrida’s later work, and its relation to 
what one might call the performativity or event-character o f deconstruction. Specters o f  Marx 
is clearly not La voix et le phénomène. It is a text that was written with enormous urgency to 
address a specific context at a specific historical moment, to make an intervention at once 
theoretical, cultural and political. As such, I think that Specters o f Marx should be viewed as 
a certain enactment of the injunction that the book seeks to describe or prescribe. Might we not 
view Specters ofMarx'm terms of what it says about the event (SdM 125-26/74-75), namely the 
event o f the injunction of différance happening here and now without presence? Specters o f  
Marx is an event, a performance, a staging which, as Samuel Weber has shown (I refer to an 
unpublished paper, ‘Piece-Work’, given at the University of Essex in October 1994), is utterly 
pervaded by its own theatricality, most obviously in Derrida’s deployment o f Hamlet as a 
frame for his reading. A serious question arises for me at this point, however: ifwe take on board 
Derrida’s remarks on the need for a non-negative, non-reactive thinking of tele-technology and 
the media, might one not have doubts about whether the book -  however staged, however 
theatrical, however performatively conceived -  is the most felicitous medium for the enactment 
of such a singular event? How about the use of other media: theatre, television, compact disc, 
internet?
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absolute singularity, singular because differing, precisely, and always other, 
binding itself necessarily to the form o f the instant, in imminence and in 
urgency: even i f  it moves toward what remains to come, there is the pledge [le 
gagé] (promise, engagement, injunction and response to the injunction, and so 
forth). The pledge is given here and now, even before, perhaps, a decision 
confirms it. It thus responds without delay to the demand o f justice. The latter 
by definition is impatient, uncompromising, and unconditional.
No différance without alterity, no alterity without singularity, no singularity 
without here-now.« (SdM 60/31)
A full commentary on this compressed and rich passage would constitute a 
separate lecture in itself. It would at the very least cause us to link the urgency 
and injunction of Marx to the theme of le gage which, as I have shown 
elsewhere, is the key to an understanding of Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in 
De l ’esprit23. However, the central thought here is that the injunction of SdM-  
of différance and Marxism -  is l ’ici maintenant sans présence, that is, the 
absolute singularity of justice happening now without presence. We should 
hear in the ‘here and now’ both the classical and theological hic et nunc and 
the semantic richness of the maintenant, understood both as the now, but also 
as the ‘maintaining’, that is, the act of maintenance or maintaining/sustaining/ 
bearing, where the present participle connotes an act of presencing irreducible 
to the present (Gegenwart). We might even hear the thought of the hand- 
holding (manutenere -  manus, teuere) of the now which appears in Derrida’s 
reading of Heidegger24.
For Derrida, the ethico-political imperative of Marxism happens now, it is 
maintained at this very moment and is not postponed to a utopian future.25 It 
would seem to me that the entire plausibility of SdM rests upon this difficult 
thought of the here and maintaining-now without presence as an impossible 
experience o f justice. If this thought proves absolutely unintelligible, then one 
can perhaps follow Derrida no further.
Derrida associates the injunction of différance, or the injunction of Marx, with 
his notion of democracy to come (la démocratie à venir), which has been an 
increasingly persistent theme in Derrida’s recent work (SdM 110-111/64-65). 
Once again, Derrida is anxious to distinguish la démocratie à venir from any 
idea of a future democracy, where the future would be a modality of the 
lebendige Gegenwart, namely the not-yet-present. Derrida’s discourse is full
23 Question of the Question: An Ethico-Political Response to a Note in O f Spirit’, in
The Ethics o f  Deconstruction, op. cit. pp. 190-200.
241 owe the last two sentences to a conversation with Samuel Wcbcr. On the hand in Heidegger, 
see ‘Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand’, in Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. J.Sallis 
(Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1987), pp. 161-96.
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of negations at this point: democracy is not to be confused with the living 
present of liberal democray, lauded as the end of history by Fukuyama, neither 
is it a regulative idea or an idea in the Kantian sense, nor even a utopia, insofar 
as all these conceptions understand the future as a modality of presence (SdM 
110/65). It is a question here of linking la démocratie à venir to différance 
understood in the above-mentioned sense as l ’ici maintenant sans présence, as 
an experience of the impossible without which justice would be meaningless. 
In this sense, la démocratie à venir does not mean that tomorrow (and tomor­
row and tomorrow) democracy will be realized, but rather that the experience 
of justice as the maintaining-now of the relation to an absolute singularity is 
the à venir of democracy, the temporality of democracy is advent, it is arrival 
happening now. As I have hypothesized elsewhere, democracy is the future of 
deconstruction, but this future is happening now, it is happening as the now 
blasting through the continuum of the present.26 In this sense, we might speak 
of la démocratie à venir not as a fixed political form of society, but rather as a 
process of democratization. Although, I cannot go into the requisite detail 
here, it would be a question of developing at least three further points:
1. To show how the time of justice, that is, the time of the injunction of 
différance, of Marxism and la démocratie à venir, can be understood as 
messianic time in the sense developed by Benjamin in the ‘Theses on the 
Philosophy of History’27; that is, as that Jetztzeit, which Derrida translates as 
»Га-présent« (»the at-present« SdM 96/181), that now which is not the empty 
and homogenous flow of objectivist history governed by the Gegenwart, and 
which Benjamin assimilates to a notion of historical materialism.
2. To show how the Benjaminian notion of messianic time can be thought in 
relation to Levinas’s notion of ethical time or the temporality of what he calls, 
with great discretion in the Preface to Totality and Infinity, messianic
25 In some improvised remarks on deconstruction and pragmatism, Derrida distinguishes the 
thought of the messianic, as the here and now of justice, from the conventional meaning of 
utopia (which does not exclude the possibility ofother meanings for utopia). See Deconstruction 
and Pragmatism, ed. C. Mouffe (Routledge, London and New York, forthcoming). I quote: 
»The messianic experience of which I spoke takes place here and now; that is, the fact of 
promising and speaking is an event that takes place here and now and is not utopian. This 
happens in the singular event of engagement, and when I speak of la démocratie à venir this 
does not mean that tomorrow democracy will be realised, and it does not refer to a future 
democracy, rather it means that there is an engagement with regard to democracy which consists 
in recognizing the irreducibility of the promise when, in the messianic moment, it can come (ça 
peut venir). There is the future (il y  a de t ’avenir). There is something to come (il y  a à venir). 
That can happen...that can happen, and I promise in opening the future or in leaving the future 
open. This is not utopian, it is what takes place here and now, in a here and now that I regularly 
try to dissociate from the present.«
26 See The Ethics o f  Deconstruction, op. cit. p. 241.
27 In Illuminations, trans. H. Zohn (Fontana/Collins, London, 1973), pp. 255-66.
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eschatology28. Levinas opposes the time of justice to the ontological or eco­
nomic notion of time and history that reduces and reifies individuals, deter­
mining them in terms of their works, relations of exchange and productivity. 
When Levinas claims that »When man truly approaches the Other he is 
uprooted from history«29,1 think »history« here refers to the objective history 
of the victors, or »barbarism« in Benjamin’s sense of the word. At least on my 
reading, Levinas’s work attempts to rub history against the grain, to find the 
»ruptures in history«30, to produce a history for those without works or texts, 
what I have elsewhere called ethical history.31 The historical materialist, in 
Benjamin’s sense, blasts open the continuum of objectivist history in the name 
of another history, in the name of justice, which would not be -  for Benjamin, 
Levinas or Derrida -  an end to history, but the continual working over of 
history as a work of infinite mourning, a politics of memory, the insomniac 
experience of being haunted by the specters of the past. Levinas writes, »Of 
peace there can only be an eschatology. (...) That peace does not take place in 
the objective history disclosed by war, as the end of that war or as the end of 
history.«32
3. To show how the time of justice in Derrida, as the maintaining-now without 
presence, can be productively linked to the temporality of the ethical relation 
in Levinas. Levinas’s later work proceeds from a distinction between two 
orders of time: synchrony and diachrony. Synchronic time is a linear, infinite 
series of punctual moments spread along the axes of past, present and future -  
what one might call, with Bergson, the spatial representation of time or, with 
Heidegger, the vulgar Aristotelian concept of time. Diachrony, on the other 
hand, is -  literally -  the coming apart of time, it is time as the punctual present 
falling out of phase with itself (le déphasage de I ’instant) or the time of the 
lapse (le laps). In Bergson’s sense, diachrony is the real time of subjectivity: 
the unique, unrepeatable and mobile temporality of la durée; in Heidegger’s 
sense, it is the temporalisation of time (die Zeitigung der Zeit), the authentic 
experience of time from which the inauthentic time of synchrony is derived. 
Levinas’s basic and astonishing claim is that the concrete case in which time 
temporalizes itself as diachrony is in the everyday event of my reponsibility 
for another33. Time is accomplished in a relation to the other. This relation is
28 Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis (Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1969), pp. 22- 
24.
29 Totality and Infinity, op. cit. p. 52.
30 Ibid, p. 52.
31 The Ethics o f  Deconstruction, op. cit. p. 30.
32 Totality and Infinity, op. cit. p. 24. Incidentally, if this view of Levinas’s conception of history 
is right, then it makes little sense to claim that Levinas is an anti-historical thinker, as Derrida 
appears to do in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ (in Writing and Difference, op. cit. p. 94).
33 Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1981), p. 10.
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not an experience of presence for Levinas, but is rather a relation to the other 
that is underwritten by an experience of the trace, the trace of the infinite as 
that past which has never been present. For Levinas, the essence of time is 
temporisation: postponement, patience, the undergoing of time as senescence, 
the passivity of ageing. Time establishes a relation to the future that is not 
achieved through laying hold of the future, as Heidegger attempts in his 
analyses of Verstehen and Entwurf, but in a »lack of any hold upon the 
future«34. The enigma of time -  the time of justice -  for Levinas lies in an 
experience of time that differs from the present, both as an absolute past and an 
ungraspable future, precisely as trace and as différance. And yet, this experi­
ence of time happens now, blasting through the contiuum of the present in a 
relation to the other, the experience of justice. Interestingly, this temporal and 
ethical structure is what Levinas would call (and would Derrida call it?) 
témoignage', testimony or witness35.
However, we are still a little distant from the theme of the messianic, although 
it has been presupposed in everything that has been said in the last few pages. 
Something is rotten in the state of Denmark, the time is out of joint. The lesson 
that Hamlet learns from the political assasination of his father, according to 
Derrida, is that the order of law, of the state, is based on violence, vengeance 
and injustice. Given this identification of law and violence — which, Derrida 
rightly claims, is Shakespere’s question before it is Nietzsche’s, Heidegger’s 
or Benjamin’s (and whose is it before Shakespere? Homer’s?) -  how is one to 
think of justice at this time of disjuncture? Derrida asks, and it is here that the 
messianic in introduced for the first time, qualified by a characteristically coy 
‘quasi’,
»If right or law stems from vengeance, as Hamlet seems to complain... can one 
not yearn for a justice that one day, a day belonging no longer to history, a 
quasi messianic (my emphasis, s.c.) day, would finally be removed from the 
fatality o f vengeance.« (SdM 47/21)
In these fascinating pages, Derrida is weaving together a dense fabric of 
allusion and argument, where he associates (i) the experience of disjuncture (a 
crucial word in these pages), of Hamlet’s sense of the time being out of jo in t-  
the order of law as vengeance -  with (ii) the disjuncture of the ethical relation 
in Levinas, which is precisely that which cannot be assembled into a totality 
and (iii) Heidegger’s meditation on time and justice in Der Spruch der 
Anaximander, where dike is translated as jointure or Fug, and which is thought 
together with a-dikia as Unfug or dis-juncture. Although I cannot go into the
34 Time and the Other, trans. R. Cohen (Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1987), p. 80.
35 In this regard, see Levinas’s ‘Vérité du dévoilement et vérité du témoignage’, Archivio di 
Filosofia ( 1972), pp. 101-10.
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detail of Heidegger’s text here36, what interests Derrida is Heidegger’s at­
tempt, firstly, to suspend all traditional conceptions of law as calculative, 
metaphysical and deconstructable, and to seek to think justice in relation to the 
donation of time, namely the presencing of the present (das Anwesende des 
Anwesen), and to think something like Being non-metaphysically in relation to 
this presencing.
However, and in a way that will be familiar to Derrida-watchers, he poses the 
following critical question to Heidegger. Namely,
»Once one has recognized the force and the necessity o f thinking justice on the 
basis o f  the gift, that, beyond right, calculation and commerce... is there not a 
risk o f inscribing this whole movement ofjustice under the sign o f presence, 
albeit the presence to meaning o f the Anwesen, o f the event as coming into 
presence, o f Being as presence joined to itself, o f the proper o f the other as 
presence?« (SdM 55/27).
Thus, if Heidegger thinks justice in relation to the presencing of the present, 
that is, in terms of a jointure that gathers and harmonizes, Derrida’s question is 
to whether justice, understood with Levinas as a disjunctive relation to the 
other, »supposes on the contrary the irreducible excess of a disjunction or an 
anachrony, some Un-fuge, some ‘out of joint’...« (SdM 55/27) In the inter­
rogative mode (but does a question, or a series of questions, constitute an 
argument? Is it enough? Is one persuaded? A vast question), Derrida engages 
in a reversal of Heidegger where he hypothesizes that justice as disjuncture -  
»the de-totalizing condition of justice« (SdM 56/28) -  is the condition for the 
presencing of the present. It is in this way (and Derrida recognizes the hasti­
ness and provisionality of his formulations at this point) that the relation of 
deconstruction to the possibility of justice can be thought, where justice -  
»that which must (without debt and without duty) render itself to the singular­
ity of the other« (SdM 56/28) -  is the undeconstructable condition of possibil­
ity for deconstruction.
Although the way in which Derrida links his argumentation to Heidegger and 
Shakespere is novel, the above conclusion -  deconstruction is justice -  will 
hardly be surprising to readers o f ‘Force of Law’. However, what is novel are 
two subsidiary claims that Derrida tags on to the above argumentation: firstly, 
this account of justice is called a »desert-like messianism« by Derrida, »the 
messianic: the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity 
of the arrivant as justice« (SdM 56/28). Secondly, this notion of the messianic 
is interpreted as »an ineffaceable mark... of the heritage of Marx« (SdM 56/
36 ‘The Anaximander Fragment’, in Early Greek Thinking, trans. D. Krell & F. Capuzzi (Harper 
and Row, New York, 1975), pp. 13-58.
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28). Thus, combining the two claims, the heritage of Marx that Derrida wants 
to endorse is that of a messianic appeal for justice.
The theme of the messianic, allied to the name of Marx, recurs at crucial points 
in SdM. After stating that he endorses the kind of critical analysis (of ideology 
and capital) that we have inherited from Marxism, Derrida links this to the 
»schwache messianische Kraft« of Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of 
History’, what he calls, emphasizing the adjectival rather than substantive 
usage, a »messianique sans messianisme« (SdM 96/181, & cf. 103/59,112/65).
(A further parenthetical worry begins to take shape here: namely, if this 
messianic appeal for justice is the way in which the heritage of Marxism is to 
be assumed, then, Derrida goes on,
»Failing which (Faute de quoi) one would reduce the event-ness (1 evénementa- 
lité) o f the event, the singularity and the alterity o f the other.
Failing which (Faute de quoi) justice risks being reduced once again to 
juridico-moral rules, norms o f representations, within an inevitable totalizing 
moment...« (SdM 56-57/28).
My question would be: is the passage from the messianic appeal for justice to 
laws, norms and rules always a fault (une faute), always in default? If so, why 
is it a fault and what sort of fault is it? Clearly for Derrida, to refer the 
messianic appeal for justice to moral and legal conditions is a transgression of 
the apparent priority, or indeed apriori antecedence of the messianic -  what 
Derrida elsewhere calls »the universal dimension of experience«37 -  but is this 
transgression not also a necessity? Is it not the most necessary of necessities, 
namely the moral-legal-social instantiation of justice, the aposteriori and 
particular instance of the apriori status of the messianic? To employ the 
language of the above quote, is not totalization inevitable? Isn’t the question 
not whether to totalize, but how to totalize, that is, how to link the apriori and 
the aposteriori, the universal and the particular, the transcendental and the 
empirical? As we will see below, the notion of the New International recog­
nizes the necessity of instantiation, totalization, the aposteriori, the particular 
and the empirical, but I have two further telegraphic thoughts in this regard:
1. Is not this faulty move from justice to law precisely that which is thought by 
Levinas in terms of the move from the other (autrui) to the third party (le 
tiers), from ethics to politics? It might also be noted that, in ‘Ideologie et 
idéalisme’, Levinas also defines Marxism as an ethical »prophetic cry...the 
revolt of Marx and of Marxists beyond Marxist science«38, but that, for
37 See, ‘The Deconstruction of Actuality’, op. cit, p. 36. On the apriori, see ibid, p. 32.
38 In De dieu qui vient à l'idée (Vrin, Paris, 1986), p. 19.
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Levinas, politics would be the measure brought to the ethical relation to the 
other, without which the latter would risk being »angelic«, »the spirituality of 
angels« (if not specters) that is the source of his critique of Buber’s I-Thou 
relation. How is one to combine (is one to combine?) the thought of justice 
with the thought of measure, which, of course, also entails the question of 
judgement?
2. In a recent debate with Axel Honneth, I have, with some significant and 
important reservations, attempted to support and amplify his attempt to show 
the possible compatibility or mutual supplementarity of Derrida’s recent re­
flections on ethico-political issues with the Habermasian programme of dis­
course ethics, in order to show how the messianic appeal for justice conceived 
as a relation to the irreducible singularity of the other might be combined with 
a broadly Kantian and procedural theory of justice, capable of testing the 
validity of moral-political norms. The question here is: if it can be shown that 
the reciprocity and symmetry axiomatic to Habermasian discourse ethics stand 
in need of supplementation by a non-reciprocal, asymmetrical appeal to justice 
or the messianic, then is not the same true vice versaV9
However, on the question of Marxism and messianism, are we not evading a 
rather basic and crude question? Marx had many swingeing and unkind things 
to say about the Young Hegelians, but what he endorsed in their approach was 
their critique of religion, writing famously that, »Religion is the sigh of the 
oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world and the soul of soulless 
circumstances. It is the opium of the people.«40 As the Theses on Feuerbach 
make clear, the problem with the Young Hegelians is that their concept of 
alienation is restricted to the critique of religion, a critique which is »essen­
tially complete«41. So, against Marx, Derrida would seem to want to maintain 
the irreducibility of the religious in its ‘desert-like’ form. Is this plausible? At 
least four features can be noted here:
1. The irreducibility of the spectral is linked to the irreducibility of the 
religious for Derrida, where Marx’s critique of religiosity would be part and 
parcel of his ontological approach. Hantologie is premised upon the irreduc­
ibility of forms of non-identity and alterity, where the religious is a privileged 
form of such alterity.
2. More specifically, in Derrida, the irreducibility of the religious is the desire 
to maintain the sublimity of the religious, which is expressed in Benjamin’s 
messianism and elsewhere (in Levinas, in negative theology). Derrida op-
39 C£ 'Habermas und Derrida werden verheiratet: Antwort auf Axel Honneth’, Deutsche 
Zeitschriftfiir Philosophie, Vol.42, No.6 (1994), pp. 981-92.
40 Cf. David McLellan, The Thought o f  Karl Marx (Macmillan, London, 1971), p. 23.
41 Ibid, p. 22.
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poses, and this is a theme one can find dealt with at great length in Glas, any 
notion of religiosity rooted in what I called above a phenomenology of incar­
nation (which one might also call a phenomenology of the beautiful), the 
incarnation of the living presence of the divine in the form of the person of 
Christ and, ultimately, in the spiritual form of the community in Hegel and the 
material form of communism in Marx.
3. In opposing this logic of incarnation in religion, Derrida works to under­
mine (i) the historical teleology of religion in Hegel which leads irresistably to 
Christianity, the revealed religion; (ii) the Aufliebung of religion in philosophy 
found at the end of the Phenomenology o f Spirit and one condition (only one, 
the other being the becoming-spirit of the subject) for the possibility of 
Absolute Knowing; and (iii) the Aufhebung of the Young Hegelian critique of 
religion into the critique of political economy in Marx. All of these gestures 
would be ontological for Derrida.
4. Is one lead to conclude from the above that the irreducibility of religious 
sublimity in Derrida’s notion of the messianic allows one to identify his 
position with that accorded by Hegel to Judaism, as an abstract and formalistic 
religion of duty, where justice is placed above love? Is hantological Marxism 
a continuation of what we might call ‘philosophical Judaism’ by other means? 
And is this justifiable?
Derrida goes some way to addressing this question in his most revealing 
discussion of the messianic which comes close to the end of SdM (SdM 266- 
67/167-69). Derrida asks: what is the relation between Marxist messianism, as 
»a universal structure« (SdM 266/167), and that other desert-like Abrahamic 
messianism of Judaism? Having set up the question nicely, Derrida doesn’t 
really give a satisfying response, asking himself whether Abrahamic messianism 
would a préfiguration or (to use Levinas’s word, which is how he refers to the 
divine as the trace of illeity42) »prénom« of Marxist messianism. Why not, 
perhaps. Nonetheless, and always in the interrogative mood, Derrida asks, 
»Can one conceive an atheological heritage of the messianic?« (SdM 266/168) 
and suggests a few lines later that »One may always take the quasi-atheist (my 
emphasis, s.c.) dryness of the messianic to be the condition of the religions of 
the Book...« (267). Derrida goes on to qualify the messianic in terms which 
recall my discussion of différance and la démocratie à venir in terms of 
»imminence« and »urgency«, and calls it »a ‘messianism’ that despairs« (SdM 
268/169). A religion of despair, then? Perhaps.
However, taking as a cue Derrida’s qualification of the messianic as ‘quasi­
atheist’ (although what exactly does the coy ‘quasi’ mean here?), another
42 Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, op. cit. p. 185.
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avenue can be briefly pursued. In his reading of The German Ideology, Derrida 
comes across Marx’s citation of Stirner’s words »Ja, es spukt in der ganzen 
Welt«, poorly rendered into French as, »Oui, le monde entier est peuplé de 
fantômes« (SdM 216/136). What holds Derrida’s attention is the phrase es 
spukt, het spookt, ça spectre, it spooks. Derrida comes back to this phrase right 
at the end of SdM (SdM 272/172); what interests him is the way in which the 
logic of spectrality is expressed verbally (es spukt from spuken), that is, as a 
movement, what Derrida calls the »passive movement of an apprehension«. 
This passive movement is the very movement of haunting, of the ghost, of the 
ghosting of the ghost, la revenance du revenant. Derrida makes an interesting 
paraleli between the spookiness of haunting and the experience of 
Unheimlichkeit in Freud and Heidegger (SdM 273-77/173-75). However, spe­
cifically in relation to the question of religion, I would like to associate the es 
spukt with the uncanniness of the il y  a as this is figured in the work of Levinas 
and Blanchot. Although I cannot go into detail here43, the il y  a should not be 
confused with the Heideggerian es gibt (might one link the es spukt with the es 
gibt: es spukt Sein, es spukt Zeit?), for it is both Levinas’s word for Being and 
his attempt to ruin the Seinsfrage. With the il y  a, Levinas asks us to undertake 
a thought experiment, »Let us imagine all beings, things and persons, reverting 
to nothingness?«. But what would remain after this annihiliation of all Seienden? 
Nothing? Levinas claims that this very nothingness of all existents would itself 
be experienced as a kind of presence, not the presence of the lebendige 
Gegenwart, but what he calls elsewhere »An atmospheric density, a plenitude 
of the void, or the murmer of silence«44. To compress to the point of incompre­
hensibility, the experience of the il y  a, is what Blanchot would call le neutre 
which is opened in the experience of writing and literature. I have claimed that 
the il y  a is the secret of Blanchot’s work, its primal scene, which is an 
experience of dis-aster, of the night without stars45. What interests me here is 
the way in which the experience of the es spukt, that is, the impossible 
experience of spectrality (i.e. the ghost is there, but does not exist; it is neither 
present nor absent) shares certain features with the il y  a. The latter is an 
experience of the night, the night of imsomnia for Levinas or what Blanchot 
calls the other or essential night towards which the desire of the writer tends. It 
is also, crucially, an experience of haunting, it is the night of ghosts, which 
Levinas illustrates with the example of Banquo’s ghost which returns after 
death to haunt Macbeth46. In the night of the il y  a, which is also the space of
43 For a much fuller discussion of the il y  a, see ‘A Dying Stronger than Death (Blanchot with 
Levinas)’, The Oxford Literary Review, Vol.15 (1993), pp. 81-131.
44 Cf. Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1978), pp. 57-64.
45 ‘A Dying Stronger than Death’, op. cit. pp. 119-20.
46 Existence and Existents, op. cit. p. 62. It might be recalled that it is Levinas who writes in Time
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many of Blanchot’s récits, the frontier between the living and the dead is criss­
crossed: the living are unable to either live or die and the dead refuse to lie 
down. The il y  a is an experience of the impossibility of death -  horror of 
horrors -  which Derrida has himself explored in his recent Aporias47. Death is 
the impossibility of my possibility which outstrips my powers, it is that of 
which I am ultimately unable (je ne peux plus pouvoir). With this in mind, we 
might explore some of the specters in Levinas’s text, particularly his discus­
sion of the return of le revenant of scepticism after its refutation, which, it has 
been claimed, is the specter of Derrida in Levinas’s Autrement qu'être™. 
However, the thought that I would like to pursue here is the following: might 
not the »quasi-atheist« messianism of SdM be linked with the es spukt and the 
il y  a, not as a religious messianism, but precisely as an experience of atheistic 
transcendence? Does the impossible experience of the es spukt, the spectrality 
of the messianic, look upwards to a divinity, divine justice, or even the starry 
heaven that frames the Moral Law, or rather does it not look into the radically 
atheist transcendence of the il y  a, the absence, dis-aster and pure energy of the 
night that is beyond law?
The Political
I suggested above that what is perhaps most impressive and most urgent about 
SdM is its call for a re-politicization of deconstruction in terms of a Marxist 
hantologie. I also indicated two of the political consequences of a pre- 
deconstructive Marxist ontologie, and suggested that the logic of spectrality in 
Derrida could be linked to the neo-Gramscian logic of hegemony in the work 
of Ernesto Laclau. It is time to try and make good on these suggestions.
In what we might justifiably refer to as his deconstruction of Marxism -  that is, 
a reading that identifies a double gesture within Marx’s texts—Laclau radicalizes 
Gramsci’s critique of the economistic stagism and historical determinism of 
traditional Marxism.49 Roughly and readily, Laclau opposes the almost mecha­
nistic vision of historical materialism advocated in the Second International 
and in certain Marxist texts (the example given is the Preface to the Contribu­
andthe Other (op. cit. p. 72) that »it sometimes seems to me that the whole of philosophy is only 
a meditation on Shakespere«.
47 Trans. D. Dutoit (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1993).
48 Robert Bemasconi, ‘Skepticism in the Face of Philosophy’, in Re-reading Levinas (Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 1991), pp. 149-61.
49 My brief presentation of Laclau’s work is based on the eponymous opening essay from New 
Reflections on the Revolution o f  our Time (Verso, London, 1990, pp. 3-85), rather than Laclau 
and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Verso, London, 1985), which presents the 
same deconstruction of Marxism from within a genealogy of the concept of hegemony.
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tion to the Critique o f Political Economy), with an account of history based on 
the irreducibility of class struggle and antagonism, a tendency that one can 
also find within Marx’s texts, for example at the beginning of the Communist 
Manifesto. Thus, although Laclau would endorse the traditional Marxist ac­
count of capitalism in terms of its often pernicious dislocatory effects, he does 
not think that these dislocations can simply be referred to the alleged eco­
nomic and historical objectivity of contradictions between the forces and 
relations of production, the effects of the infrastructure on the superstructure, 
but are rather the consequence of continual ‘hegemonic articulation’s (for me, 
the key concept in Laclau’s work), of incursions of the political and the 
ideological into the socio-economic-historical realm, where infrastructure and 
superstructure form what Gramsci would call a ‘historical bloc’. Such 
hegemonic articulations temporarily fix or stabilize the meaning of social 
relations in a transient equilibrium. Such a ‘hegemonic equilibrium’ of the 
social is not to be transcended in a communist society free from power, 
contingency, antagonism and politics itself -  the millenarian vision of commu­
nist society that sometimes gets the better of Marx and which, with the 
privilege of hindsight, it is all too easy to confuse with the totalitarian myth of 
social transparency. In contradistinction to the traditional Marxist theodicy 
that would claim that the dislocations of capitalism lead inexorably to the 
simplification of the class structure, and the emergence of the proletariat as the 
revolutionary class and privileged agent of history, Laclau argues that the very 
dislocatory effects of late capitalism -  what we might think of as the phenom­
enon of combined and uneven development -  lead instead to a progressive 
fragmentation of the social and a proliferation of social actors (for example, 
the decline in the organizing power of the state and in the credibility of 
traditional political parties and the increasing prominence of ethnic, national, 
sexual or ecological protest movements). Perhaps Laclau’s most challenging 
and controversial thesis is that these phenomena of dislocation and fragmenta­
tion lead not only to a proliferation of political possibilities, but are also the 
conditions under which something like freedom is possible; that freedom is a 
consequence of dislocation. The democratic transformation of society -  what I 
still want to call socialism -  is one of these political possibilities (and only 
one, there are others, particularly on the radical right, which have been signifi­
cantly more successful at hegemonizing in recent decades), but there is no 
economic or historical inevitability to such an outcome. Socialism will only be 
the consequence or, better, the permanent activity of intense hegemonic articu­
lation and political effort. It is, to say the least, unclear whether the traditional 
notion of the political party, confined within the nation state is adequate to 
such a task.
An expanded notion of hegemony becomes a way of arguing for the primacy
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of politics over socio-economic relations, although the former can in no way 
proceed without continual reference to the latter and the former is done for the 
sake of the latter. As such, the concept of hegemony points in two different 
temporal directions at once: first, with regard to history, hegemony is a way of 
explaining how certain social relations became fixed, and shows that such 
fixing is not the consequence of the ‘objective’ contradiction of forces and 
relations of production, but rather is the product of contingency, antagonism 
and power, that is to say, it is the consequence of a decision (i.e. the transfor­
mation of history into genealogy). Second, the concept of hegemony leaves the 
future radically open and indeterminate, which means that nothing is guaran­
teed, but neither is anything lost, at least not yet. On this view, rather than 
standing at the end of history, it might be said that we stand at some sort of 
beginning, at the point when we can recognize the radical contingency and 
limitedness of our finitude. Such a situation need not lead to the pessimism of 
an Adorno or the passivity or the resignation of a later Heidegger, but can also 
be the condition for a »new militancy and new optimism«50.
If deconstruction is the attempt to show the constitutive undecidability, radical 
incompletion or untotalizability of textual, institutional, cultural, social and 
economic structures, then hegemony is a theory of decisions taken in the 
undecidable terrain opened up by deconstruction, and which, in my view, is 
precisely the way in which we might begin to think about the politics of 
deconstruction51. The burning question here is whether and how we can com­
bine the logic of deconstruction with the logic of hegemony: does undecidability 
paralyze the possibility of the decision or does it, on the contrary, enable it?
With regard to SdM, the fate of the question of deconstruction and hegemony, 
to my mind, turns on how we interpret the following thought: in relation to the 
generalized dislocation of the contemporary world, Derrida claims, the messi­
anic hesitates, it trembles; he writes,
»This messianic hesitation does not paralyze any decision, any affirmation, 
any responsibility. On the contrary, it grants them their elementary condition. 
It is their very experience.« (SdM 269/169).
Is messianic hesitation the experience o f the decision? That is the question, as 
Hamlet might soliloquize. If our response is positive, then we might be able to 
solder the logics of deconstruction and hegemony at this point.
In SdM, Derrida indeed speaks of hegemony, using the word -  which is, to my
50 New Reflections on the Revolution o f  our Time, op. cit. p. 82.
51 In this regard, see Laclau’s short article ‘Discourse’, in The Blackwell Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, eds. R. Goodin & P. Pettit (Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), 
pp. 431-37.
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knowledge, relatively new to his vocabulary52 -  on at least eight occasions 
(SdM 69[x2], 73[x2], 90, 91, 96-7, 149/37[x2], 40[x2], 51, 52, 55, 90), mostly 
during the discussion of Fukuyama and the so-called death of Marxism. The 
first time he uses the word, he even refers to Laclau’s work, making the 
interesting and valid point that »Flaunting belongs to the structure of every 
hegemony« (SdM 69/37). However, rather than viewing hegemony as a theory 
of the decision and the positive possibility of politicization, Derrida 
(mis)understands hegemony negatively in its traditional sense as domination. 
He writes, for example, that, »...a dogmatics is attempting to install its world­
wide hegemony in paradoxical and suspect conditions. There is today in the 
world a dominant discourse...etc.« (SdM 90/51) This is unfortunate. However, 
if the concept of hegemony is (mis)understood traditionally in SdM, there is 
nonetheless, I believe, a logic of hegemony at work in the text. This logic turns 
around a phrase that forms part of the book’s subtitle, and which, in Georges 
Sorel’s terminology, we might describe as the mobilizing ‘myth’ of SdM: The 
New International571. In many ways, this is the key to SdM, but my worry is 
whether the key fits the lock of the present political situation.
Derrida lists what he calls the ten afflictions of the ‘New World Order’ in a 
kind of tableau noir (SdM 134-39/81-84). After listing unemployment, 
homelessness and other woes, the final item on his list, which is privileged 
above the other terms (»surtout, surtout«, he writes, SdM 138/83) is the 
present state of international law, which he rightly sees as being dominated by 
the interests of certain ‘hegemonic’ nation states. In contradistinction to this, 
Derrida suggests that we require a New International that, »is being sought 
through these crises of international law, it already denounces the limits of a 
discourse on human rights that will remain inadequate, sometimes hypocriti­
cal, and in any case formalistic...« (SdM 141/85). This reference to the formal­
ism of human rights, echoing the Hegelian-Marxist critique of their abstrac­
tion and one-sidedness, is illuminating and is followed by some qualifications 
of the New International. He writes of the bond around which something like 
solidarity might form, »It is a link of affinity, suffering and hope, a still 
discreet, almost secret link, like that around 1848, but more and more visible -  
we have more than a sign of it.« (SdM 141/85) Thus, the New International 
would be focussed around a common bond or link, that -  at this point in history 
at least -  is almost secret. Derrida goes on to claim that this bond would be, 
»...without party, without country, without national community (International 
before, across, and beyond any national determination), without co-citizen­
52 Although Derrida speaks of »l’hégémonie centralisatrice« and »l’hégémonie nationale« in 
L ’autre cap (Minuit, Paris, 1991), pp. 45 & 48.
53 This notion is first introduced in Chapter 1 (SdM 58/29), but receives a fuller discussion as the 
centrepiece of Chapter 3.
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ship, without common belonging to a class.« (SdM 142/85) A strange bond, 
then: without reference to the figures of community, class, party, nation or the 
other traditional means of collective identification or hegemonization. Yet, 
Derrida insists, this bond of the New International is inspired by at least one of 
the spirits of Marxism. Which one? Clearly not the ontological Marxism of the 
proletariat, the party and the revolution characterized above as ontological. 
Derrida continues in a luminous passage, which I quote at length,
»Now i f  there is a spirit ofMarxism which I  will never be ready to renounce, it 
is not only the critical idea or the questioning stance (which Derrida qualifies 
on the previous page as the spirit o f  the Enlightenment, s.c.)...It is rather a 
certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain experience o f the 
promise that one can try to liberate from any dogmatics and even from any 
metaphysico-religious determination, from any messianism. And a promise 
must promise to be kept, that is, not to remain ‘spiritual’ or ‘abstract’, but to 
produce events, new forms o f action, ofpractice, o f organization, etc. To break 
with the ‘party form ’ or with such and such form o f the State or the Interna­
tional does not mean to renounce every form ofpractical or effective organiza­
tion. It is exactly the contrary that matters to us here.« (SdM 146-47/89)
I couldn’t agree more. The New International must be in the spirit of the 
Marxist idea of critique (critique of ideology and of capital) and the quasi­
atheist notion of messianic affirmation or promise that we discussed above and 
which proceeds in the name of justice and emancipation. Furthermore, such 
critical and messianic promises must be made with the intention of being kept, 
and thus the promise of the New International must in its turn give rise to new 
forms of organization, activism and political aggregation. In relation to what I 
said above about the injunctions of différance and la démocratie à venir, the 
urgency of the New International cannot be deferred or postponed indefinitely; 
it must be approached in messianic terms as Vici maintenant sans présence. 
The New International is happening now, at this very moment; Derrida writes,
»And there are signs. It is like a new International, but without a party, or 
organization, or membership. It is searching and suffering, it believes that 
something is wrong, it does not accept the ‘new world order’...«5*
To my mind, Derrida would here seem to be trying to sketch the preconditions 
for a new socialist hegemonic articulation, a political decision taken in the 
name of justice and in the face of the world’s afflictions.
The only question I have here is the following: how is the New International to 
be hegemonized? What forms and means should it employ? Around what
54 ‘The Deconstruction of Actuality’, op. cit. p. 39.
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figures should it agitate? Should it agitate around figures? Who does it in­
clude? Who does it oppose? Does it oppose? Does it exclude?
I do not have convincing answers to these questions and I am not really in the 
habit of delivering prophecies to the masses, but, in closing, let me hasard 
three critical thoughts.
1. I find Derrida’s suggestions on the subject of the New International a little 
vague, suggesting that, »...the new International belongs only to anonymity.« 
(SdM 148/90) He goes on, in the same paragraph, to suggest that within the 
academic and intellectual world, the New International includes those who 
have resisted the anti-Marxist dogma of recent years and remained hyper­
critical in the Enlightenment spirit, without renouncing the ideals of democ­
racy and emancipation. Who does Derrida have in mind here? Jiirgen Habermas?
2. Also, the limits of the New International begin to look a little vague when 
Derrida writes that, »Whether they wish it or know it or not, all men and 
women, all over the earth, are today to a certain extent the heirs of Marx and 
Marxism.« (SdM 149/91) Perhaps this is right. But so what? Couldn’t the 
same be said -  perhaps with even greater justification -  about Adam Smith or 
John Locke? Are we not all heirs to their marketing strategies? Thus, there is 
the risk of a rather empty universalism on Derrida’s part at this point.
3. Finally, on the question of organization, although Derrida is rightly dubious 
of the idea of a communist party as the privileged and sole means for revolu­
tionary transformation, he tends to link this to a rather questionable historical 
positivism which claims that, »What tends perhaps to disappear in the political 
world that is announcing itself, and perhaps in a new epoch of democracy, is 
the domination of this form of organization called the party...« (SdM 167/102) 
Again, on the next page, he says of this hypothesis »...that this mutation has 
already begun; it is irreversible.« (SdM 168/103) Derrida tags two claims onto 
this hypothesis: (i) that the correlate of the party, i.e. the state, is also ex­
hausted; and (ii) that the notion of the party cannot adapt to the exigencies of 
the contemporary public space with its domination by the media and tele­
technology. In relation to this second point, I have two words to offer: Forza 
Italia. If Derrida is right, how does one explain the brief but stunning electoral 
success of this alliance which would seem (entirely cynically, to my mind) to 
combine a fairly classical party structure with the exigencies of the televisual 
media forms? An analysis of the 1994 elections in South Africa, although with 
a more progressive outcome, might also consider this question of the relation 
between the party form (in this case, the ANC), the media and the democratic 
process. However, to return to the first point, my question is the following: if 
the political party is not an adequate vehicle for promoting something like a 
New International, which might be justified although I have my (doubtless
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nostalgie) doubts about this, then how does one hegemonize something like 
the New International outside of traditional party structures? What means of 
identification, figuration and hegemonization are available? Furthermore, how 
does one work outside traditional party structures without collapsing into a 
‘divide and rule’ designer politics of individualism or confining oneself to the 
always modest socio-economic changes of single issue politics, or, worst of all 
worlds, devoting oneself to an intra-academic politics of vacuous radicalism 
and reaction?
